The Cuban Missile Crisis and the Threat of Nuclear War Lessons from History

Description

The decision whether to use nuclear weapons that faced political and military leaders forty-five years ago may be the choices facing leaders in crises situations today and in the future. In this spirit, Professor Scott has written a book of compelling interest.

The Cuban Missile Crisis is the term used in the west to describe the events of October 1962, described by Robert Kennedy as the world brought to the abyss of nuclear destruction and the end of mankind. On 27 October that year, Robert McNamara said 'as I left the White House and walked through the garden to my car to return to the Pentagon on that beautiful fall evening, I feared I might never live to see another Saturday night'.

It was indeed probably the most dangerous moment in all human history. Yet debate remains about the risk of nuclear war and what lessons might be learned from the events of 1962 in understanding the role of nuclear weapons in international politics. The purpose of this book is to examine the role of nuclear weapons in the light of a huge amount of recent research and to evaluate the risk of inadvertent nuclear war. Over the last decade, research on the crisis has revealed aspects at the operational level that suggest the risk of nuclear war was greater than assumed. Yet much greater insight can be gained into the attitudes and perceptions of the principal decision makers, Kennedy and Khrushchev. It is one of the arguments of this book that the leaders were in fact increasingly determined to avoid escalation. It is not so much what they could do to the enemy that is decisive when a political leader considers this risk. It is what such a war might do to his own country, his own power and his place in history. The main themes of this book are the role of nuclear weapons in the conduct of foreign policy, in deterring armed conflict and in risking nuclear war.

Table of Contents

Author(s)

Len Scott,

Reviews

"chilling testimony to the high risk of future nuclear catastrophe."

 

Reviewed by John Moore in Morning Star, 2008

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"Scott follows the crisis and its possible outcomes from every point of view."

 

Reviewed by Michael Simmons in History Today, 2008

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"An impressive work by a leading political scientist...masterly"

 

Reviewed by Jeremy Black, The Historical Association, 2008.

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"Written by Len Scott, an authoritative voice within the field of international politics and history, this thorough research into the crisis examines the actions from all sides of the conflict... Scott has produced an insightful, entertaining and comprehensive account of many facets surrounding the crisis...this book should be enjoyed by all."

 

Reviewed by Stuart Lee in Birmingham Post, 2008

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"[An] impressive study" - Contemporary Review

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“In his comprehensive yet remarkably succinct new analysis of the vast literature on the missile crisis, Len Scott asks questions seldom addressed by missile-crisis scholars. His core mission is to articulate a way to think rationally about the mountains of data that have been collected on the events of October 1962…Until we begin to make progress towards radically reducing the number and usability of nuclear weapons, we will never have too many books on the Cuban missile crisis. We need to have our noses rubbed in the retrospective horror of the near miss of October 1962. In showing us why we can never rule out the possibility that something like it might happen again, Scott helps us stay focused on the need to reduce our reliance on the kind of weapons that the missile crisis was all about.” –James G. Blight, International History Review, March 2009

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'This book is a masterpiece: a comprehensive, thoughtful investigation of world security and those who attempt to explain it.  Brilliantly written, the book is breathtaking in its sweep.' - International Affairs

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